America's election: It's not foreign policy, stupid | Lowy Institute

US President Joe Biden’s withdrawal from the presidential race is just the latest development in two weeks of absolutely gripping updates from the United States. From once calling this election a snoozefest, consider my interest now thoroughly rapped.

But as US domestic politics gets all the more thrilling with 100-or-so days to go to the election, the same twists and turns should not be expected in the realm of foreign policy.

We’re entering the set-and-forget stage for America’s approach to the world. Despite a new name soon to be decided atop the Democrat ticket, US foreign policy is about to get boring. Here’s why.

US presidential campaigns focus on kitchen table concerns, the issues that are most proximate to the daily life of the average voter. Foreign policy is not one of them. With 80 per cent of American voters feeling that their country was “spiralling out of control” just last week, even the most dazzling international initiative will not be enough to motivate a voter to turnout in November.

Voters are driven by the issues such as the cost of living, access to affordable healthcare, education and social services, and feelings of safety. While there may be temptations in a tumultuous world for a new Democrat candidate to make their mark on US foreign policy, the focus for the rest of their year is the economy, stupid.

Foreign policy is often decried as the lofty realm for the out-of-touch Washington elite, the so-called “blob”.

The economy has been the stubborn frontrunner of American’s top concerns this election year. Despite positive economic indicators – growth that exceeded expectations, a strong labour market, falling inflation – less than a quarter (23 per cent) of Americans think the economy is doing well.

In fact, 36 per cent cite an economic issue as the most important problem facing the United States right now, while another 22 per cent say immigration. Only about 8 per cent say the same of a foreign policy issue.

Making promises to lower the cost of living or reduce rates of crime is not only a matter of creating appealing policies, but of making a candidate more relatable.

Foreign policy is often decried as the lofty realm for the out-of-touch Washington elite, the so-called “blob” to which 2016 presidential hopeful Hillary Clinton belonged. Her aloof image was sealed by appearing unsympathetic to kitchen table concerns like coal mining jobs in the Rust Belt.

This is one reason that Biden speaks so frequently about his working-class upbringing and the importance of unions and worker-centred trade policy, and of being a single father. It connects to people. In 2020, Biden made gains against Clinton’s efforts in 2016 with suburban voters (+9%) and among white non-college voters (+5%).

Running a campaign on a calculated foreign policy does few favours to a candidate wanting to represent the average Americans, when a majority of Americans (55%) want to see the United States pay less attention to problems in other countries and instead concentrate on issues at home.

Tapping into these trends of isolationism, the Trump-Vance Republican ticket presents a hard-headed isolationist foreign policy that would see the United States disengage from foreign wars – especially Ukraine – reduce its overseas aid, ensure its national security through domestic strength, and take a zero-sum approach to international trade (100% tariffs on Chinese manufactured cars, for example).

This has some appeal in the electorate. A third of Americans (31%), and a majority of Republicans, say the United States is providing too much support to Ukraine. Another third, and majority of Republicans, think the United States does not benefit from NATO membership.

Finding a foreign policy strategy that captures the American public is a difficult calculation. It can’t publicly appear “woke” or wonky.

But Trump’s stunning encouragement for Russia to “do whatever the hell they want” to a NATO country that doesn’t pay its defence spending requirement was a whiplash brand of isolationism that does little to enhance feelings of security. It is out-of-touch with the sizeable 43% of Americans that still want to see the United States actively engaged in international affairs. And it is out of touch with the majority of Trump voters who oppose, even more so than Biden voters, the idea of reducing US military presence in allied nations.

Finding a foreign policy strategy that captures the American public is a difficult calculation. It can’t publicly appear “woke” or wonky, must hold foreign commitments in balance alongside domestic priorities, and should maintaining a level of US involvement in world affairs that ensures its own security and interests without overcommitting.

This descriptor matches the tenets of the “foreign policy for the middle class” strategy deployed in Biden’s term. It’s one that has seen the United States tend to its alliance networks and international institutions while building up its domestic capacity in manufacturing and defence. The as-of-yet unknown new face of the Democrats will therefore look almost certainly whole lot like Biden.

The world is watching for clues of the direction whoever emerges as the Democratic party’s candidate may take US foreign policy. Speculation about Kamala Harris’ likely approach has already begun. It is tempting to sift through the campaigns to predict what could be when January rolls around and a new president takes then helm. But these messages are not meant for us pundits overseas. They’re meant for the American voter who cares more to know the presidential candidate laments the price of a loaf of bread as much as they do, not that they have a plan for a hypothetical security crisis in the Taiwan Strait.